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BOOK REVIEWS

take some credit, though, and, again from the organization's point of view,
the ability to take credit for significant political action is a way of strengthening
the organization in the eyes of supporters and opponents alike. Second, by
opposing Hoover's nomination, the NAACP contributed to the construction
of the emerging coalitioin in the Democratic party, soon to support Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal. After the fight over the Parker nomination, the NAACP
and its constituency no longer felt strong ties to the party of Abraham Lincoln.
Goings may overstate somewhat the importance of the NAACP's
opposition in contributing to the nomination's defeat, although he discusses
the role of labor unions and of sheer partisanship as well as the role of
the NAACP. Goings argues that, although labor union opposition to Parker
was also strong, the key votes, and the ones that were up in the air when
the nomination was announced, came from Senators who responded primarily
to the position of the African-American community and only secondarily
to the position of labor unions. As he acknowledges, because the vote was
so close, virtually any factor can be called the critical one.
Goings also argues that the NAACP was right to oppose Parker, who
had been, and continued to be, a relatively unimaginative judge whose positions
rarely strayed from relatively narrow interpretations of Supreme Court
precedents. Goings's discussion of Parker's civil rights decisions after Brown
v. Board of Education probably criticizes Parker too much for betraying
"the spirit of Brown" (p. 89). Parker did write, on remand in Briggs v. Elliott,
that under Brown "the Constitution.. .does not require integration. It merely
forbids discrimination." That statement did become a rallying cry for
supporters of token desegregation. But, it is unclear that the so-called Parker
dictum is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's understanding of Brown
through the 1950s. Similarly, Parker did uphold North Carolina's Pupil
Placement Act, which was a subterfuge designed to delay desegregation and
keep it at token levels when it was inevitable. Yet, the Supreme Court itself
summarily upheld Alabama's similar statute shortly thereafter. Though Parker
was not a bold supporter of desegregation in the 1950s, neither was the Supreme
Court.
In sum, Goings's book is a useful addition to the literature on the
organizational aspects of the struggle for civil rights.
MARK TUSHNET

Georgetown University Law Center
Richard A. Cosgrove, Our Lady the Common Law: An Anglo-American
Legal Community, 1870-1930. New York and London: New York

University Press, 1987. x, 330 pp. $40.00.
Our Lady the Common Law is a collection of essays on eight English
and American legal thinkers-Langdell, Bryce, Holmes, Pollock, Maitland,
Pound, Frankfurter, and Laski-which are linked by the theme enunciated
in the subtitle of the work. These scholars were intellectually bound together
by a devotion to academic legal science and eventually driven apart by the
inroads of politics and the clash of personalities. Along the way Cosgrove
presents vivid intellectual portraits, fleshed out by extensive use of the personal
papers of both major and supporting characters aided by a thorough
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acquaintance with the published sources and the secondary literature. The
notes and the full bibliography provide an outstanding guide to current
scholarship on late nineteenth century Anglo-American legal thought. The
result is solid collective intellectual biography Which, by the author's admission,
pays little attention to substantive law because the Anglo-American legal
community, as opposed to individual members, "had little influence in this
direction" (p. 4). The resulting study of legal culture brings to light ignored
aspects of late nineteenth century legal history.
The most important aspect of this legal culture is the influence of the
man Cosgrove calls "the grey eminence of the Anglo-American legal
community," John Austin (p. 144). In fact, it is not unfair to summarize
the content of the Anglo-American legal community as John Austin plus
certain strong personalities. Whether explaining some of the perceived
paradoxes of Holmes's thought by reference to Austinian ideas about the
role of force in law, the separation of law and morals, and the nature of
sovereignty (pp. 110-127), pointing out Pollock's rejection of Austin in favor
of what he saw as the insights of Maine's historical jurisprudence (pp. 143148), showing how Pound's modification of Austinian ideas diminished his
English reputation and thus helped disrupt the community (pp. 208-211),
or how Laski's rejection of analytical jurisprudence undid the intellectual
underpinnings (pp. 250, 267-268), Cosgrove places the reaction to Austin's
ideas at the heart of theorizing about the nature of the common law. By
doing so he effectively shifts the terms of discussion away from the fixation
on the identification of a structure of doctrine called "classical orthodoxy"
which has come to dominate scholarly discussion of the period. The subsequent
weakening of the community in the face of Frankfurter's and Laski's fascination
with politics not only illustrates the nature of the shared outlook but also
the uncritical acceptance of classical economic liberalism and opposition to
socialism of the earlier generation of teachers (pp. 225, 259, 155-156). In
short, Cosgrove's attempt to portray a legal culture is both challenging and
successful within the compass he has set.
Criticism of the work, therefore, runs the danger of asserting that the
author should have written a different book. I believe, however, that as valuable
as the concept of legal culture is, the neglect of substantive law contributes
to a weakness in one of the fundamental conceptions of the study. One of
Cosgrove's important points is that the concept of legal science was
meaningless, that it could not sustain any serious analysis of law or a true
intellectual community. The failure started with Langdell, continued with
Holmes, and came to a dismal fruition in Pound (pp. 27-33, 114-116, 206).
Only Maitland, who understood that legal history required the interpretation
as well as the collection of facts, seems to have been a true "scientist" (pp.
170-175).
Cosgrove's frustration with Langdell's cryptic comments on law and
science is thoroughly justified. A consideration of how Langdell practiced
legal science, however, may reveal that his "crudely inductive procedure" was
in reality the same idea of legal science that had thoroughly dominated
antebellum legal thought. Where his intellectual forebears, however, sought
for great principles that would order all society, Langdell, a good Austinian,
contented himself with elucidating the narrow principles of the technical law
of contract and of equity jurisdiction in the name of training technically
competent lawyers rather than vague theorists of the good life. His approach
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appealed to Charles Eliot because it taught law not at second hand from
treatises but from the original sources, the cases, and because when brought
to the classroom it required, not the rote recitation of the old regime, but
rather the effort to grapple with the sources just as a practitioner must. Langdell
did indeed lay the foundations of a legal science, one dependent on the
Austinian precepts and the separation of academics and politics which
Cosgrove so well illuminates. Its collapse might then be explained not only
by the clash of personalities and the allure of politics but also by legal realism's
emphasis on non-rational motives in judging. Any such fuller explanation,
however, will be built in good part on Cosgrove's work.
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA
New York Law School

Donna J. Spindel, Crime and Society in North Carolina, 1663-1776. Baton
Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1989. xvii, 171
pp. $25.00.
The surviving records of criminal justice in colonial North Carolina are
voluminous, a large number of them for years have been available in a definitive
edition, and until the publication of this work they have been mostly unused
for purposes of scholarly inquiry. Donna J. Spindel, professor of history
at Marshall University, has done much to rectify this unfortunate omission.
Spindel located in the welter of higher and lower courts in colonial North
Carolina a total of 4,108 criminal actions for the years 1670-1776. What
proportion of actions prosecuted during these years this represents is impossible
to say, since significant gaps exist in all surviving series.
As might be expected from the nature of the highly heterogeneous file
papers with which she had to work, the author was confronted with formidable
challenges in the collection and analysis of her data. These challenges, along
with her solutions, are stated in a note on methodology. Numerous tables
present the erstwhile chaos of data clearly by various periods of time and
often by type of court, and include such categories as numbers of prosecutions
by type of crime, by region of the colony, by socioeconomic classification,
and by sex; and disposition of actions, and punishments inflicted, by similar
categories.
The author draws inferences from the data with commendable caution,
with the result that her conclusions, though valuable, usually present few
real surprises: justices tended to be plural office-holders and less well qualified
than their counterparts in other colonies; theft of animals loomed large as
a species of crime; prosecutions for crimes against morals declined in number
as the colony grew, reflecting a "growing secularity of values"; assault was
the most frequently prosecuted offense; contempt prosecutions were most
numerous in the 1720s and 1730s, paralleling the political tempestuousness
of those decades; women were prosecuted more for crimes against morals
than for any other category of crime; laborers were in general more likely
to be indicted and convicted than were planters. Occasionally, however, more
venturesome conclusions are advanced, such as that women became more
physically aggressive as time passed, or that courts were more tolerent of
crimes of violence by the poor than by the gentry, or that sentencing appears

